We present three quantum key distribution protocols using entangled state. The first protocol is based on the idea of qubit transmission in blocks. Although it needs quantum memory, its theoretic efficiency approximates to 100%. The second protocol does not need quantum memory and its efficiency for qubits can achieve 100%. The third protocol is a controlled quantum key distribution protocol which can be applied to a special cryptographic scenario.
Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the most promising applications of quantum information science. The goal of QKD is to allow two legitimate parties, Alice and Bob, to generate a secret key over a long distance, in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve, who interferes with the signals. The security of QKD is based on the fundamental laws of physics. Together with the Vernam cipher, QKD can be used for unconditionally secure communication. Since the BB84 protocol [1] , the first QKD scheme, was published, many variations on QKD have been subsequently proposed. They can be roughly classified into "prepare and measure" protocols, such as BB84, B92 [2] , and "entanglement based" protocols, such as E91 [3] , BBM92 [4] . The efficiency is one of the important parameters of QKD protocol. Many efforts have been made to improve the efficiency of QKD protocol. To improve the efficiency of the BB84 QKD protocol, the scheme in Ref. [5] assigns significantly different probabilities for the different polarization bases during both transmission and reception to reduce the fraction of discarded data. However, it needs a refined analysis of accepted data in their scheme. Hwang et al. [6] proposed a modified BB84 QKD scheme that increases its efficiency to nearly 100%. However, the communication parties need a common secret key in their scheme. From the point of view of information theory, Cabello [7] defined the efficiency of a QKD protocol, E = bs qt+bt , where b s is the number of secret bits received by Bob, q t , b t is each the number of qubits, classical bits interchanged between Alice and Bob during the QKD process. Here the classical bits used for eavesdrop checking have been neglected. As has been discussed by Cabello, the efficiency of BB84, E91, cabello 2000 [8] , is 25%, 50%, 67%, respectively. Actually, qubit is more expensive than classical bit. The efficiency equation E (called the total efficiency) cannot describe the efficiency of QKD protocol sufficiently. The efficiency for qubits is a useful complement to analyze the efficiency of QKD protocol, which is defined as η = qu qt , where q u is the useful qubits and q t is the total qubits transmitted. To evaluate the efficiency of a QKD protocol, we should combine these two parameters.
In this paper, we present three QKD protocols using entangled state. The first protocol whose idea is based on qubit transmission in blocks uses Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs to distribute a secret key. The theoretic efficiency of the protocol approximates to 100%, because all EPR pairs are used to distribute a secret key except those chosen for checking eavesdroppers. However, the flaw of the first protocol is that it needs quantum memory during the QKD process. We then present the second protocol which does not need quantum memory. In the second protocol, although the total efficiency is 50%, the efficiency for qubits approaches 100%. To solve a special cryptographic task, we propose a controlled QKD protocol. The two communication parties can only generate their sharing key with the permission of the controller. This protocol can also be used to distribute a secret key among three parties. We also show the three protocols are completely secure.
QKD protocol with block transmission
Based on the idea of block transmission [9] , we present a QKD protocol whose efficiency reaches 100%. The security of the present protocol is ensured by the random Hadamada transformation. Our protocol (protocol 1) is detailed as fol-lows:
(1) Alice prepares an ordered N EPR pair in the Bell state
We denotes the ordered N EPR pairs with
]}, where the subscript indicates the pair order in the sequence, and A, B represent the two particles of EPR pair. Alice takes one particle from each EPR pair to form an ordered EPR partner particle
The remaining EPR partner particles compose B sequence,
. Alice transmits B sequence to Bob.
(2) To prevent eavesdropping, Bob selects randomly a sufficiently large subset from B sequence and performs Hadamard transformations on them. He then announces publicly the position of the selected particles. After hearing from Bob, Alice executes Hadamard transformations on the corresponding particles in A sequence.
(3) Note that |φ
The two parties' Hadamada transformations will not change the initial state. Alice then measures the particles in A sequence in Z-basis {|0 , |1 }. Bob measures the particles in B sequence in the same basis as Alice. Thus they have established a raw key. In this step, they can also measure each of their particles in X-basis {|+ , |− }.
(4) Alice and Bob then publicly compare their measurement results to check eavesdropping. Bob chooses randomly a sufficiently large subset from his results and announces them publicly. Alice compares Bob's results with her corresponding results. She can thus find out whether there is an eavesdropper in the transmission line. If too many of these measurements disagree, they abort the protocol. If they confirm that there is no eavesdropping, Alice and Bob utilize privacy amplification and error correction to distil the final key.
The crucial point is that the Hadamard transformations at step 2 and 3 of the protocol do not allow Eve to have a successful attack and Eve's attack will be detected during the eavesdropping check. Protocol 1 is similar to the modified Lo-Chau protocol [10] , but protocol 1 does not need classical message except that used for eavesdropping check. The security of protocol 1 is the same as the modified Lo-Chau protocol which is proved unconditionally secure. According to the efficiency formula defined by Cabello, the total efficiency of protocol 1 can be made asymptotically close to 100%. Here the classical bits used for eavesdrop checking have been neglected. The efficiency for qubit can also achieve 100% because all EPR pairs are used to distribute a sharing key except those used to check eavesdropping.
QKD protocol without quantum memory
Although protocol 1 is efficient, it is necessary for the protocol to use quantum memory. We then present another QKD protocol (protocol 2) without quantum memory. Protocol 2 works with following steps.
(1) Alice prepares randomly an EPR pair in one of the following states
and sends particle B to Bob.
(2) After hearing from Bob, Alice publishes the information of the initial state she prepared. If the initial state is |φ − , both Alice and Bob perform Hadamard transformation on each of their corresponding particles. Otherwise, they do nothing. After Hadamada transformation, |φ − is changed to |φ
Alice and Bob measure their corresponding particles in X-basis. They agree that |+ (|− ) corresponds to bit "0" ("1").
(3) The parties repeat the above steps N times and generate N raw secret keys.
(4) To check eavesdropping, Alice selects randomly a sufficiently large subset of her measurement results and tells it to Bob. Bob publishes his measurement results of the sampling particles. Alice then evaluates the error rate during the transmission line. If the error rate exceeds the threshold they preset, they will abort the protocol. Otherwise, they will utilize privacy amplification and error correction to distil a final key. Now, let us analyze the security and the efficiency of protocol 2. Firstly, the protocol is secure against the interceptresend attack by Eve. In this attack, Eve intercepts particle B and makes measurement on it, and then resends a particle to Bob according to her measurement result. Eve can only intercept particle B at the step 1 of the protocol and she cannot make certain which particle will be executed Hadamard transformation. Thus Eve can only measure the intercepted particle in Z-basis or X-basis randomly. Suppose Eve measures the intercepted particle which belongs to |φ + in Zbasis. If the result of Eve's measurement is "0" ("1"), she sends a particle in the state |+ (|− ) to Bob. Then the state of the two particles collapses to |0+ AB or |1− AB , each with probability 1/2. Thus the error rate introduced by Eve will reach 50%. During the eavesdropping check, Eve's attack will be detected. Suppose Eve performs X-basis measurement on the intercepted particle which belongs to |φ − . Then the state of the two particles collapses to | + − AB or | − + AB , each with probability 1/2. After Hadamada transformation, the state is changed to |01 AB or |10 AB . The error rate introduced by Eve will also reach 50%.
Secondly, the protocol is safe against collective attack. In this strategy, Eve intercepts particle B and uses it and 1-4244-0605-6/06/$20.00 ©2006 IEEE.
her own ancillary particle in the state |0 to do a CNOT operation (particle B is the controller, Eve's ancillary particle is the target). Eve then resends particle B to Bob. However, Eve has no information of the initial state. Suppose the initial state is |φ
After Eve's collective attack, the state of particles A, B and Eve's ancillary particle becomes
where the subscript E indicates Eve's ancillary particle. According to the protocol, Alice and Bob perform Hadamada transformations on their corresponding particles and obtain
Obviously, Eve's eavesdropping will be detected during the eavesdropping check because half of Bob's results will be inconsistent with that of Alice's. As we described above, the total error rate introduced by Eve is 25%. Actually, the security of protocol 2 is equal to that of the modified LoChau protocol. We can also give a Shor-Preskill-type proof to protocol 2. In protocol 2, the efficiency for qubits is 100% because all EPR pairs are used to generate a key except those chosen for eavesdropping check. It is not necessary for protocol 2 to use quantum memory. However, it needs a bit of classical message to generate a bit of sharing key. Therefore, the total efficiency of protocol 2 is 50%. Certainly, we should pay more attention to the efficiency for qubits because qubit is more expensive than classical bit.
Controlled QKD protocol
Han et al. [11] proposed a controlled QKD scheme with three-particle entanglement. According to their scheme, the Eq. 1 of their scheme should be
Suppose Bob intercepts the two photons which Alice sends to Bob and Carol. He then performs Bell basis measurement on the intercepted photons and obtains |φ + and |ψ − , each with probability 1/2. Bob will obtain Alice's measurement result and his action will not be detected by Alice. Bob then resends one of the intercepted particles to Carol. According to their scheme, Bob and Carol can establish sharing key without the control of Alice. To solve this problem, we propose another controlled QKD protocol (protocol 3). Suppose only Alice can prepare the entangled state. Bob and Charlie can only generate their sharing key under the control of the controller Alice. Without Alice's permission, Bob and Charlie cannot establish their sharing key. Certainly, the sharing key is secret to Alice. Protocol 3 is detailed as follows:
(1) Alice prepares a three-particle entangled state in the state
or
randomly. She then sends particles B and C to Bob and Charlie, respectively.
(2) After confirming that Bob and Charlie have received their particles, Alice measures particle A in Z-basis or Xbasis randomly. She then publishes her measuring basis. If Alice performed Z-basis ( X-basis) measurement, Bob measures particle B in X-basis (Z-basis) and Charlie performs Z-basis (X-basis) measurement on particle C.
(3) The parties repeat the above steps N times and each obtains N measurement results. The value of N is large enough to check eavesdropping, but not enough to generate a key which is long enough to ensure the security of cryptography. To generate a secure key, the parties should run the protocol twice at least.
(4) Alice chooses randomly a sufficiently large subset from her measurement results and publishes the positions of the sampling particles. She then lets Bob and Charlie publish their measurement results of the sampling particles. Note that
They can make certain whether there exists eavesdropping by comparing their measurement results. If there is no eavesdropping, they continue to the next step. Otherwise, the protocol is halted. (5) If Alice permits Bob and Charlie to establish their sharing key, she publishes her measurement results of the particles on which she performed X-basis measurements. The parties let |0 , |+ correspond to binary "0" and |1 , |− correspond to binary "1". If Alice's measurement result is |+ , Bob and Charlie obtain a identical raw key "0" or "1". If Alice's measurement result is |− , Bob or Charlie should invert the bit value of the key to obtain a identical key. Obviously, the key is secret to the controller Alice. If Alice, Bob and Charlie want to establish a three-party key, it only needs Alice to publish the initial state of the particles on which Alice performed Z-basis measurement. If the initial state is |Ψ 2 , Bob should invert his bit of the key. They can also distil a final key using privacy amplification and error correction.
We now discuss the security of protocol 3. The two states |Ψ 1 and |Ψ 2 which are prepared randomly by Alice, ensure that Bob and Charlie cannot establish sharing key without Alice's permission. Suppose Bob intercepts particles B and C and performs Bell basis measurement on the intercepted particles. Note that
According to Eq. (8), Bob cannot make certain the state of particles B and C. He also has no information on Alice's result. During the eavesdropping check, his action will be detected by Alice. Alice then stops the protocol. Because the parties have run the protocol only once, Bob and Charlie cannot generate a secure sharing key even if they have obtained some random EPR pairs. Without regard to the special cryptographic task, the security of the present protocol can be reduced to that of the BBM92 protocol because the parties measure their corresponding particles in Z-basis or X-basis randomly.
To improve the efficiency of protocol 3, we can adopt the same method used in Ref. [11] . Alice measures her particle in Z-basis (X-basis) with probabilities ε (1 − ε), where 0 < ε ≤ 1. Obviously, it needs a refined data analysis to ensure the security of the protocol.
Conclusion
In summary, we propose three QKD protocols with entangled state. It is unnecessary for protocol 1 and protocol 2 to use alternative measuring basis. Thus all EPR pairs of the two protocols are used to generate a secret key except those chosen for eavesdropping. By using block transmission, the total efficiency of protocol 1 can achieve 100% but it needs quantum memory. Protocol 2 does not need quantum memory and the efficiency for qubits is 100% because the parties measure their particles in determinate measuring basis, but the total efficiency of protocol 2 is 50% for the use of classical bit. In view of the fact that qubit is more expensive than classical bit, more attention should be paid to the efficiency for qubits. Protocol 3 is a controlled QKD protocol which can be applied to a special cryptographic task. Bob and Charlie establish their sharing key under the control of Alice. Only with Alice's permission could Bob and Charlie generate an identical key. Protocol 3 is multifunctional, which can also be used to distribute a key among three parties. It is appropriate for QKD network.
